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DOES DELAWARE'S SECTION 102(b)(7) PROTECT
RECKLESS DIRECTORS FROM PERSONAL LIABILITY?
ONLY IF DELAWARE COURTS ACT IN GOOD FAITH
Matthew R. Berry
Abstract: Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Corporate Code allows a corporation to
amend its certificate of incorporation to exculpate directors from all duty of due care
violations. The Delaware General Assembly enacted this law in response to the shrinking
pool of qualified directors, which was caused by the Delaware State Supreme Court's
decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom that imposed personal liability on directors for gross
negligence. Delaware courts have unequivocally stated that section 102(b)(7) protects
directors against personal liability arising from gross negligence, but not against liability
arising from a lack of good faith. However, Delaware courts have not provided clear
guidance as to whether the statute protects directors from personal liability arising from
recklessness. If Delaware courts classify reckless conduct as a breach of the duty of due care,
then section 102(b)(7) protects directors from liability arising from recklessness. Conversely,
if Delaware courts classify reckless conduct as a breach of the duty of good faith, then
section 102(b)(7) offers reckless directors no protection. This Comment proposes that section
102(b)(7) protects directors from personal liability arising from reckless decisions for two
reasons. First, recklessness is merely a subset of gross negligence in Delaware corporate law.
Because section 102(b)(7) unambiguously protects directors from liability arising from gross
negligence, it also protects them from liability arising from recklessness. Second,
recklessness by definition is conduct that involves no intention to cause harm. Because the
Delaware State Supreme Court requires an illicit motive or bad faith state of mind to
establish bad faith conduct, a reckless director breaches only the duty of due care and is
protected by section 102(b)(7).
Directors play a crucial role in the corporate decisionmaking process.'
They oversee and advise managerial decisions and provide a necessary
check on top managerial power. In fulfilling these tasks, the directors
owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders,3 and face
personal liability for damages arising from the breach of any of these
fiduciary duties.4 However, directors in a typical corporation face time
and budget constraints and cannot always make decisions based on full
1. See E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of
Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399, 400 (1987).
2. See id.
3. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (stating that directors are charged
with a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders when carrying out their managerial
roles).
4. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (stating that directors are
personally liable for monetary damages if they breach any of their fiduciary duties).
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and accurate information.5 Holding directors personally liable for
negligence, or even gross negligence, in the decisionmaking process
might harm corporations 6-many qualified directors may become
reluctant to serve on boards because they desire to limit their personal
exposure to liability. 7 Those directors who do serve on boards would
become increasingly risk-averse causing them to avoid risky projects
with potentially high returns for the corporation. 8
The Delaware General Assembly enacted section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware Corporate Code9 to provide directors with additional
protection from personal liability. The legislators attempted to remedy
directors' difficult position of making material decisions on incomplete
information, and to encourage them to act in the shareholders' best
interests.10 Section 102(b)(7) provides shareholders with an option to
amend their corporation's certificate of incorporation to include an
exculpation provision. 1 Delaware courts have interpreted this provision
to protect directors from personal liability arising from simple and gross
negligence. 12 Further, section 102(b)(7) provides that directors are not
5. See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review
of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as
a Standard of Review Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 449, 451-52 (2002).
6. See id. at 449.
7. See id.; see also E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking in
Corporate Law, 53 BuS. LAW. 681, 692-93 (1998) (discussing the shortage of directors after the
Van Gorkom court held directors liable for their grossly negligent conduct).
8. See Veasey, supra note 7, at 693-94.
9. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003). Section 102(b) reads in relevant part:
In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of incorporation by
subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all of the
following matters:
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a
director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director:
(i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders;
(ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from
which the director derived an improper personal benefit.
Id.
10. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001); Veasey, supra note 7, at 692-
93.
11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7); Veasey et al., supra note 1, at 402.
12. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093, 1094-95 (Del. 2001) (concluding that
section 102(b)(7) protects directors from liability arising from gross negligence).
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Personal Liability of Reckless Directors
protected from liability arising from their bad faith conduct.13 However,
the courts have not provided clear guidance as to whether section
102(b)(7) protects directors from personal liability arising from their
reckless conduct. 14
This Comment argues that the Delaware State Supreme Court should
interpret section 102(b)(7) to exculpate directors from personal liability
arising from reckless conduct because recklessness is a breach of the
duty of due care. Part I discusses directors' fiduciary duties. Part II
outlines how Delaware courts have interpreted section 102(b)(7) to alter
directorial liability arising from breaches of those fiduciary duties. Part
III posits two arguments that section 102(b)(7) protects directors from
liability arising from their reckless conduct. First, Part III.A argues that
section 102(b)(7) protects directors from liability arising from
recklessness because recklessness is a subcategory of gross negligence
under Delaware corporate law. Next, Part III.B argues that section
102(b)(7) protects directors from liability arising from recklessness
because reckless directors lack the bad faith intent that Delaware courts
require to establish a breach of the duty of good faith. Finally, Part IV
concludes that section 102(b)(7) protects directors from liability arising
from recklessness because recklessness is a breach of the duty of due
care.
I. UNDER DELAWARE COMMON LAW, DIRECTORS OWE
SHAREHOLDERS DUTIES OF GOOD FAITH, LOYALTY,
AND DUE CARE
Delaware common law charges directors with an "unyielding
fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders."' 5 This fiduciary
duty is commonly divided into the duty of good faith, duty of loyalty,
and duty of due care. 16 If directors breach any of these three fiduciary
duties, then the shareholders can hold them personally liable for
resulting monetary damages."
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii).
14. See Veasey et al., supra note 1, at 403.
15. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
16. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
17. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90-92 (Del. 2001).
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A. Directors Owe Shareholders a Duty of Good Faith
Delaware courts do not agree whether the duty of good faith is an
independent fiduciary duty or merely a part of the duty of loyalty, 8 but
the courts do agree that directors who act in bad faith are personally
liable for any resulting damages. 19 To establish bad faith, the Delaware
State Supreme Court requires proof that the directors acted with a bad
faith motive. 20 However, the Delaware Court of Chancery 2' recently has
held that directors could act in bad faith without proof that the directors
22had a bad faith motive.
1. The Delaware State Supreme Court Requires Proof of a Bad Faith
Motive Before Finding a Breach of the Duty of Good Faith
The Delaware State Supreme Court evaluates directors' motives to
distinguish breaches of the duty of due care from breaches of the duty of
good faith.23 For example, in Zirn v. VLI Corporation,24 the Delaware
18. Some Delaware courts have concluded that the duty of good faith is merely a subset of the
duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating that
the duty of good faith is not independent of the duty of loyalty); Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 49
n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("By definition, a director cannot simultaneously act in bad faith and loyally
towards the corporation and its stockholders."). Other Delaware courts have implied that the duty of
good faith is an independent duty. See, e.g., Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 (dividing directors'
fiduciary duties into the duty of good faith, the duty of due care, and the duty of loyalty); see also
Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 483-84 (2004) (asserting that
recent Delaware decisions have treated the duty of good faith as an independent fiduciary duty).
Whether the duty of good faith is independent from the duty of loyalty is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
19. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001) (stating that the purpose of
section 102(b)(7) was to protect directors from duty of due care claims and not duty of good faith or
duty of loyalty claims).
20. See, e.g., Zim v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1061-62 (Del. 1996) (stating that the directors
acted in good faith because they lacked any motive to deceive or harm the corporation or its
shareholders).
21. Delaware's use of chancery courts is unusual in the Anglo-American judicial system. The
Delaware chancery court is a court of equity consisting of one chancellor and four vice chancellors,
all of whom are selected by the governor. See Cyril Moscow, Michigan or Delaware Incorporation,
42 WAYNE L. REV. 1897, 1917 (1996). The chancery court hears all equitable cases, but is
especially capable of adjudicating complex corporate issues given each chancellor's extensive
experience in corporate law. Id. See generally William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short
History of the Delaware Court of Chancery, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819 (1993).
22. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 290 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(concluding that the plaintiff could proceed on her breach of duty of good faith claim without proof
of directors' motives).
23. See, e.g., Zirn, 681 A.2d at 1061-62 (stating that the directors acted in good faith because
they lacked any motive to deceive or harm the corporation or its shareholders); Smith v. Van
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State Supreme Court required the plaintiff to demonstrate that directors
had an illicit motive before the court would conclude that the directors
acted in bad faith.25 In Zirn, the court considered whether directors'
material misrepresentations made during a tender offer breached the
duty of good faith.26 Instead of focusing on the severity of the
misrepresentation or the resulting harm to the shareholders, the court
evaluated whether the directors acted with a bad faith motive.27 The
court concluded that the directors acted in good faith because they
lacked any motive to deceive the shareholders.28
Similarly, in Smith v. Van Gorkom,29 the Delaware State Supreme
Court approached the question of good faith by stating that it need not
inquire into the directors' motives unless there were allegations or proof
of bad faith conduct.3° In Van Gorkom, the court held that the directors
breached their duty of due care by relying too heavily on the chief
executive officer's judgment and failing to perform an adequate
independent analysis.3' In dicta, the court noted that because the plaintiff
had not alleged or provided proof of bad faith conduct, the directors'
motives were irrelevant.32 This suggests that, had the plaintiff alleged
that the directors acted in bad faith, a court would have to evaluate the
directors' motives.
The Delaware State Supreme Court has also evaluated defendants'
motives to define bad faith conduct outside the corporate director
context. 33 In Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (stating that because there were no allegations that the
directors breached the duty of good faith, the directors' motives were irrelevant).
24. 681 A.2d 1050 (Del. 1996).
25. See id. at 1061-62.
26. Id. at 1053-54.
27. See id.
28. Id. ("The record reveals that any misstatements or omissions that occurred were made in good
faith. The VLI directors lacked any pecuniary motive to mislead the VLI stockholders intentionally
and no other plausible motive for deceiving the stockholders has been advanced." (emphasis
added)).
29. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
30. See id. at 873.
31. See id. at 893.
32. See id. at 873 ("[T]here were no allegations of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing, or proof
thereof. Hence, it is presumed that the directors reached their business judgment in good faith, and
considerations of motive are irrelevant to the issue before us." (emphasis added) (internal citation
omitted)).
33. See, e.g., Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d
1199, 1206 (Del. 1993) (evaluating a general partner's state of mind to determine if he acted in bad
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Fund, II, L.P. ,3 the court concluded that a bad faith motive is a required
element of bad faith conduct.35 The court considered whether a general
partner acted in bad faith by excluding the plaintiff from participating in
its investment funds.3 6 The court reasoned that a bad faith claim depends
upon the defendant's "tortious state of mind., 37 The court defined bad
faith as "not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather... the
conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity."38 Distinguishing, bad faith from negligence, the court
reasoned that bad faith "contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or ill will. ' 39 Therefore, the court
concluded that a "dishonest purpose" and "ill will" are required elements
of a bad faith claim.4°
2. Despite Delaware State Supreme Court Precedent, Some Delaware
Chancery Courts Have Found a Breach of the Duty of Good Faith
Even Without Proof of a Bad Faith Motive
Although the Delaware State Supreme Court requires a bad faith
motive to prove a breach of the duty of good faith,41 Delaware chancery
courts have not consistently enforced this requirement.42 For example,
the Delaware chancery court in In re Caremark International, Inc.
faith). The Delaware Court of Chancery recently applied Desert Equities' "bad faith" analysis to the
section 102(b)(7) context in McGowan v. Ferro, No. CIV.A-18672, 2004 WL 2340041, at *15-16
(Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 2004) (granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the bad faith
claims).
34. 624 A.2d 1199 (Del. 1993).
35. Id. at 1208.
36. Id. at 1202.
37. Id. at 1208.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 1208 n.16 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 337 (5th ed. 1983) (emphasis added))
(internal quotations omitted).
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., Zim v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1061-62 (Del. 1996) (evaluating the directors'
motives for a duty of good faith claim); Desert Equities, 624 A.2d at 1206 (stating that a claim of
bad faith relies upon a person's state of mind); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del.
1985) (stating that the directors' motives were irrelevant because there were no allegations that the
directors breached their duty of good faith).
42. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289-90 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(failing to evaluate the directors' motives on a duty of good faith claim); Nagy v. Bistricer, 770
A.2d 43, 49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000) (stating that regardless of their motives, directors may be held
personally liable for harm resulting from the conscious disregard of their duties).
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Derivative Litigation43 noted in dicta that directors' sustained or
systematic failure to oversee the corporate decisionmaking process is
sufficient to prove bad faith even without proof of a bad faith motive.44
Caremark involved directors who allegedly failed to monitor adequately
the corporation's compliance with the law.45 The Caremark chancellor
stated that, to prevail, the plaintiffs must prove that the directors knew or
should have known that illegal activities were occurring, that the
directors made no good faith effort to prevent or address the situation,
and that their failure to act proximately caused the damage.46 However,
the chancellor did not require the plaintiff to prove that the directors had
a bad faith motive or intent.4 7
Consistent with Caremark, the Delaware chancery court recently
concluded that directors' conscious and sustained failure to fulfill their
oversight duties was sufficient to establish bad faith in In re Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litigation.48 The Disney court considered whether
Disney's directors acted in bad faith by allowing the chief executive
officer (CEO), Michael Eisner, to unilaterally negotiate an employment
contract with Disney's new president, Michael Ovitz. 49 The directors had
almost no involvement in either the decision to hire Ovitz or the drafting
of his employment agreement.50 Instead, the directors granted Eisner full
power to negotiate and approve the final terms and conditions of the
contract without the directors' further approval. 51 A year after Disney
hired Ovitz, both Eisner and the directors realized their mistake, but the
board again did not oversee Ovitz's termination.52 Without the directors'
oversight, Eisner granted Ovitz a non-fault termination agreement that
enabled Ovitz to realize $100,000,000 in compensation from stock
53
options.
43. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
44. See id. at 971. Caremark is often credited for establishing the foundation for imposing
personal liability on directors for a breach of the duty of good faith. See Sale, supra note 18, at 468-
69.
45. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 960-62.
46. Id. at 971.
47. See id.
48. 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003).
49. See id. at 279-81.
50. See id. at 287.
51. Id. at 281.
52. See id. at 282-85.
53. Id. at 284.
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Based upon this directorial misconduct, the chancellor concluded that
the plaintiffs were entitled to proceed with their claim that the Disney
directors breached the duty of good faith.54 The chancellor found that the
plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that the directors "consciously and
intentionally disregarded their responsibilities,, 55 acted with "deliberate
,,56indifference, and "adopt[ed] a 'we don't care about the risks'
attitude .... The chancellor stated that when directors abdicate all
responsibility in making a material corporate decision, it raises the
question of whether the board's decisionmaking process was conducted
in good faith.58 Without citing any authority, the chancellor concluded
that if directors caused harm to shareholders by consciously ignoring
their corporate duties, then the directors acted in bad faith or committed
intentional misconduct.59
Unlike the Delaware State Supreme Court in Van Gorkom, Zirn, or
Desert Equities, the Disney chancellor did not inquire into the directors'
intent or motives. 60 Instead, the chancellor assumed that, given the
severity of the directors' conduct and the resulting harm, the directors
must have acted in bad faith.61 The Disney chancellor also avoided
addressing whether recklessness is sufficient to prove bad faith. In fact,
the chancellor never used the term "reckless," even though the plaintiffs
alleged that the board members "consciously and intentionally
disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a 'we don't care about the
risks' attitude concerning a material corporate decision. 62
In sum, although courts agree that directors who act in bad faith are
liable for any resulting damages,63 the Delaware State Supreme Court
54. See id. at 278.
55. Id. at 289 (emphasis omitted).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 289-90.
59. Id. at 290 ("Where a director consciously ignores his or her duties to the corporation, thereby
causing economic injury to its stockholders, the director's actions are either 'not in good faith' or
'involve intentional misconduct."' (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2003))).
60. Compare Zim v. VLI Corp., 681 A;2d 1050, 1061-62 (Del. 1996), and Desert Equities, Inc.
v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199, 1208 (Del. 1993), and Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 871, 873 (Del. 1985), with Disney, 825 A.2d at 286.
61. See Disney, 825 A.2d at 289.
62. Id. (emphasis omitted).
63. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1094-95 (Del. 2001) (stating that the
purpose of section 102(b)(7) was to protect directors from duty of due care claims and not from duty
of good faith or duty of loyalty claims).
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has not clearly defined the duty of good faith.64 The court expressly
requires a bad faith motive to establish bad faith. 65 However, some
recent chancery court decisions have concluded that directors acted in
bad faith even without proof of a bad faith motive.66
B. Directors Owe Shareholders a Duty of Loyalty
Although the duty of good faith still floats in murky waters, Delaware
courts have consistently described the duty of loyalty as the conflict
between the directors' duty to the corporation and their self-interest.
67
Within the duty of loyalty is an affirmative duty to protect the
corporation's interests and avoid any conduct that would injure the
corporation or its shareholders or deprive either of a benefit.68 Directors
breach the duty of loyalty when their economic or other interests conflict
with the corporation or its shareholders' interests.6 9
C. Directors Owe Shareholders a Duty of Due Care
The duty of due care requires that directors exercise an informed
business judgment when making corporate decisions and authorizes
courts to impose personal liability on directors for negligence or
recklessness.70 If directors make a well-informed business decision,
courts apply the business judgment rule, which limits judicial review to
scrutiny of directors' decisionmaking process rather than to the
substantive decision itself.71 Courts interpret the business judgment rule
to protect directors from liability arising from negligence, but not from
gross negligence.72 Because Delaware courts consider recklessness to be
64. See, e.g., Sale, supra note 18, at 468 ("[E]xplication of the good faith obligations-indeed,
even the use of that term-is dicta.").
65. See, e.g., Zirn, 681 A.2d at 1061-62 (stating that the directors acted in good faith because
they lacked any motive to deceive or harm the corporation or its shareholders).
66. See, e.g., Disney, 825 A.2d at 290 (holding that the plaintiff could proceed on her breach of
the duty of good faith claim without proof of the directors' motives).
67. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
68. Id.; see also 1 RODMAN WARD, JR., EDWARD P. WELCH & ANDREW J. TUREZYN, FOLK ON
THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 141.2.1.1 (4th ed. 2004) (describing the duty of
loyalty).
69. WARD ET AL., supra note 68, § 141.2.1.1.
70. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
71. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360-61.
72. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
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a subset of gross negligence,73 the business judgment rule similarly does
not protect directors from liability arising from recklessness.
1. The Business Judgment Rule Does Not Allow Courts to
Substantively Evaluate Directors' Well-Informed Decisions
The business judgment rule offers directors limited protection from
personal liability arising from business decisions.74 The rule creates a
presumption that in making a business decision, directors acted on an
informed basis, in good faith, and with the honest belief that their
decision was in the corporation's best interest.75 In light of this
presumption, courts may evaluate only the decisionmaking process and
not the substantive decision itself.76 However, courts apply the business
judgment rule only when the directors actually make a decision.77 Thus,
when directors abdicate their duties or fail to make a conscious decision,
the rule provides no protection. 8
2. The Business Judgment Rule Protects Directors from Liability
Arising from Negligence, but Not Gross Negligence
The business judgment rule protects directors from liability arising
from negligence, but not from gross negligence. 79 This limitation of the
business judgment rule became clear when the Delaware State Supreme
Court imposed personal liability on directors for their grossly negligent
conduct in Van Gorkom.80 The directors in Van Gorkom approved a
proposed sale of the company without prior consideration of the sale,
73. See, e.g., Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., No. CIV.A-7861, 1990 WL 42607, at *12 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 5, 1990) ("In the corporate context, gross negligence means 'reckless indifference to or a
deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders' or actions which are 'without the bounds of
reason."' (quoting Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929)) (emphasis added)).
Unpublished decisions may be cited to in Delaware under the Delaware State Supreme Court Rules
if a copy of the decision is attached to the brief. See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 14(b)(vi)(4), 17(a); Oglesby v.
Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 877 F. Supp. 872, 896 n.2 (D. Del. 1994); New Castle County v. Goodman,
461 A.2d 1012, 1013 (Del. 1983).
74. See, e.g., Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 (noting that a plaintiff must rebut the business
judgment rule before directors can be held personally liable).
75. See Van Gorkon, 488 A.2d at 872.
76. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361.
77. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984).
78. See id.
79. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
80. See id. at 893.
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even though there were no time constraints; 8' the directors approved
amendments to the merger agreement without reading them;82 and the
directors gave the CEO authority to execute the merger without further
board approval.83 Moreover, when the CEO did execute the merger, he
did so at a party without reading the final agreement. 84 Because the
directors' decision did not involve fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing, the
court analyzed the decision under the business judgment rule.85
However, the business judgment rule protects directors only against
personal liability arising from negligence, and the court held that the
directors' conduct amounted to gross negligence.86 Accordingly, the
court imposed personal liability on the directors for their grossly
negligent conduct.
87
3. The Business Judgment Rule Does Not Protect Directors from
Liability Arising from Recklessness Because Recklessness Is a
Subset of Gross Negligence
The business judgment rule does not protect directors from liability
arising from reckless conduct because Delaware courts deem corporate
recklessness as a subset of gross negligence. 88 "Recklessness" is the
"knowing disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk., 89 Reckless
actors have no intent to cause harm;90 instead they have an "I don't care"
attitude.9' While most courts distinguish recklessness from gross
negligence,92 Delaware courts depart from the majority view by
81. See id. at 874.
82. Id. at 869.
83. See id. at 879.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 873.
86. See id. at 873, 893 (stating that the relevant standard is gross negligence and that the directors
breached that standard).
87. See id. at 893.
88. See, e.g., Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., No. CIV.A-7861, 1990 WL 42607, at *12 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 5, 1990) (noting that in the corporate context, gross negligence means recklessness).
89. Pattern Jury Instructions for Civil Practice in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware,
DEL. P.J.I. CIV. § 5.9 (2000); see also Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Dooley, No. CIV.A.02C-07-065J0H, 2003
WL 1903771, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2003) (applying the definition of recklessness from
DEL. P.J.I. CIV. § 5.9).
90. See Dooley, 2003 WL 1903771, at *6 (quoting DEL. P.J.I. CIV. § 5.9).
91. See DEL. P.J.I. CIv.§ 5.9; see also Dooley, 2003 WL 1903771, at *6 (applying the definition
of recklessness from DEL. P.J.I. CIV. § 5.9).
92. See Allen et al., supra note 5, at 453 (noting that the gross negligence standard in Delaware
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designating corporate recklessness as a subset of gross negligence.93 For
example, in Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 94 a Delaware chancellor
considered whether directors breached their fiduciary duties in
approving a sale of one of the corporation's divisions.95 Upon holding
that the directors acted in good faith, the chancellor stated, "In the
corporate context, gross negligence means 'reckless indifference to or a
deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders' or actions which
are 'without the bounds of reason. ' '9 6 Other Delaware courts have also
concluded that gross negligence includes corporate recklessness.97 In
addition to Delaware case law, three Delaware chancellors 98 concluded
in a recent law review article that plaintiffs must establish that directors
acted recklessly to prove that they acted with gross negligence. 99
Moreover, one of the leading Delaware corporate law treatises agreed
with the three chancellors that recklessness is merely an element of a
gross negligence claim in Delaware corporate jurisprudence. 100 Because
the business judgment rule offers directors no protection from liability
arising from gross negligence, 10' it similarly offers them no protection
corporate cases is harder to establish than the gross negligence standard courts normally apply in
tort or criminal cases); see also Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 970 (Del. Ch.
1986) (stating that Delaware corporate law has a different standard for gross negligence than other
areas of the law).
93. See, e.g., Tomczak, 1990 WL 42607, at * 12 ("In the corporate context, gross negligence
means 'reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders' or
actions which are 'without the bounds of reason."' (quoting Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257,
261 (Del. Ch. 1929) (emphasis added)); see also Rabkin, 547 A.2d at 970 (noting that corporate
gross negligence is similar to recklessness); Allen et al., supra note 5, at 453 (noting that courts in
Delaware corporate cases have adopted a gross negligence standard that is similar to the
recklessness standard).
94. No. CIV.A-7861, 1990 WL 42607 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990).
95. Id. at *12.
96. Id. (quoting Allaun, 147 A. at 261 (emphasis added)).
97. See, e.g., Rabkin, 547 A.2d at 970 (noting that corporate gross negligence is similar to
recklessness); see also WARD ET AL., supra note 68, § 141.2.2.4 (noting that corporate gross
negligence is similar to recklessness); Allen et al., supra note 5, at 453 (same).
98. William T. Allen is a former vice-chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery. Jack B.
Jacobs is a former vice-chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery and is currently a justice on
the Delaware State Supreme Court. Leo E. Strine, Jr. is currently a vice-chancellor on the Delaware
Court of Chancery.
99. See Allen, supra note 5, at 453 ("Delaware corporate cases have adopted a gross negligence
standard that requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a degree of culpability on the part of the directors
that is akin to the recklessness standard employed in other contexts.").
100. See WARD ET AL., supra note 68, § 141.2.2.4.
101. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (holding directors personally
liable for gross negligence).
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from liability arising from reckless conduct.' 02
II. SECTION 102(b)(7) PROTECTS DIRECTORS FROM
LIABILITY ARISING FROM BREACHES OF ONLY THE
DUTY OF DUE CARE
The Delaware legislature enacted section 102(b)(7) 10 3 in response to
Van Gorkom to allow shareholders to further protect directors from
personal liability. 0 4 Although the statute's protections are broad in that
it protects directors from liability arising from all breaches of the duty of
due care, 10 5 it expressly states that it offers directors no protection if they
do not act in good faith.' 0 6 However, courts have not clarified whether
section 102(b)(7) also protects directors from liability arising from
recklessness.1
0 7
A. The Delaware Legislature Enacted Section 102(b)(7) in Response
to Van Gorkom
After Van Gorkom, the Delaware legislature responded to directors'
fears of potential liability and shareholders' desire to retain quality, risk-
taking directors by enacting section 102(b)(7). 0 8 The Delaware State
Supreme Court's decision in Van Gorkom, which held directors
personally liable for shortcomings in the merger approval process, sent
shock waves of apprehension throughout the corporate world.'09 This
apprehension led many qualified directors to resign out of fear of future
personal liability, which caused the pool of qualified directors to
decrease substantially." 0 Even when a corporation could find qualified
directors, the directors knew they might be personally liable if a court
declared their conduct grossly negligent."' This exposure to liability
caused many directors to become risk-averse in corporate
102. See id.
103. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003).
104. See Veasey, supra note 7, at 693.
105. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093, 1095 (Del. 2000); Zirn v. VLl Corp., 681 A.2d
1050, 1061 (Del. 1996).
106. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii).
107. See infra Part II.C.
108. See Veasey, supra note 7, at 693.
109. See Veasey, supra note 7, at 692.
110. See Veasey et al., supra note 1, at 401.
111. See Allen et al., supra note 5, at 449-51.
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decisionmaking." 12 While investors want directors who are diligent and
honest,1 3 they also want directors who are bold and willing to take
business risks. 114 To address these shareholder concerns, the Delaware
legislature enacted section 102(b)(7)." 5
B. Section 102(b)(7) Protects Directors from Liability Arising from
Breaches of the Duty of Due Care, but Not from Breaches of the
Duty of Good Faith
To determine whether section 102(b)(7) protects directors from
liability arising from alleged misconduct, courts must discern whether
the misconduct amounts to a breach of the duty of due care or a breach
of the duty of good faith.1 16 Section 102(b)(7) expressly states that it
offers directors no protection from personal liability arising from acts
not in good faith.117 However, Delaware courts interpret section
102(b)(7) to protect directors from personal liability arising from all duty
of due care violations.' 1 8 Directors breach their duty of due care through
negligence or gross negligence. 19 The business judgment rule protects
directors from liability arising from negligence, 120 and section 102(b)(7)
extends this protection to liability arising from gross negligence.'
2
'
Therefore, if a director can characterize a plaintiffs claim as alleging
only a breach of the duty of due care, then the director can invoke
section 102(b)(7) l2 2 to have the complaint dismissed. 123
112. See Veasey, supra note 7, at 693-94.
113. Veasey, supra note 7, at 694.
114. See Veasey, supra note 7, at 684-85 ("Requiring perfect, fail-safe systems can be far more
costly than any potential business loss to the stockholders.").
115. See Veasey, supra note 7, at 693.
116. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003); Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1095.
117. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
118. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093 (Del. 2001); Zim v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d
1050, 1061 (Del. 1996).
119. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating that directors receive no
business judgment rule protection if they fail to make a conscious decision).
120. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
121. See Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1094-95 (concluding that section 102(b)(7) protects directors
from gross negligence).
122. This assumes that the corporation had amended its certificate of incorporation to include
section 102(b)(7).
123. Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1094-95.
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C. Courts Are Divided as to Whether Section 102(b) (7) Protects
Directors from Personal Liability Arising from Reckless Conduct
Delaware courts agree that section 102(b)(7) protects directors from
liability arising from breaches of the duty of due care, 124 and the statute
explicitly states that it offers no protection from liability arising from
breaches of the duty of good faith. 125 However, courts have not reached
a definitive conclusion as to whether the statute protects directors from
liability arising from recklessness. 126 If courts conclude that recklessness
is a breach of the duty of due care, then section 102(b)(7) will protect
directors from liability arising from recklessness. 127 Conversely, if courts
conclude that recklessness is a breach of the duty of good faith, then
section 102(b)(7) will offer directors no protection. 128 Thus, the issue is
whether recklessness is a breach of the duty of good faith or a breach of
the duty of due care.
1. Delaware Courts Provide Little Guidance on Applying Section
102(b)(7) to Recklessness
The Delaware State Supreme Court has suggested that section
102(b)(7) will protect directors from liability arising from
recklessness.12 9 For example, in Van Gorkom, the court implicitly
determined that reckless conduct does not breach the duty of good
faith. 30 The court characterized the Van Gorkom directors' conduct as
reckless,'13 but concluded that there was no evidence that the directors
had breached their duty of good faith. 32 Although decided before the
enactment of section 102(b)(7), the Van Gorkom court's analysis
124. See, e.g., id. at 1093 (concluding that section 102(b)(7) protects directors from gross
negligence).
125. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003).
126. See Veasey et al., supra note I, at 403.
127. See Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1093 (observing that section 102(b)(7) protects directors from
personal liability arising from duty of due care claims).
128. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
129. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 871, 873 (Del. 1985) (describing the
directors' conduct as reckless, but concluding that the conduct breached only the duty of due care,
not the duty of good faith).
130. See id. at 873.
131. Id. at 871 (stating that the lower court erred by finding that the directors had not acted
"recklessly or improvidently").
132. Id. at 873.
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indicates that directors' reckless conduct does not breach their duty of
good faith.
Contrary to the Van Gorkom court's decision, the Disney chancery
court suggested that directors' reckless conduct breaches the duty of
good faith. 133 The Disney chancellor avoided the term "reckless"
throughout the opinion, but described the directors' conduct with terms
synonymous with recklessness. 134 For example, the chancellor stated that
the directors "consciously and intentionally disregarded their
responsibilities" and "adopt[ed] a 'we don't care about the risks
attitude."" 35 The chancellor concluded that section 102(b)(7) provided
the directors no protection from liability because their actions breached
the duty of good faith.
1 36
However, only two years before the Disney decision, the Delaware
Court of Chancery in Emerald Partners v. Berlin1 37 expressly questioned
the argument that recklessness breaches the duty of good faith. 138 In
Emerald Partners, the plaintiff alleged that the directors recklessly
approved a merger. 139 The plaintiff argued that section 102(b)(7) should
not protect the directors from liability because the directors' reckless
indifference amounted to a breach of the duty of good faith. 140 However,
the chancellor declined to accept this argument and responded that, at
best, the plaintiff cited equivocal authority to prove that reckless
indifference breaches the duty of good faith. 141 The chancellor ultimately
concluded that he need not determine whether reckless indifference
breaches the duty of good faith because the plaintiff failed to prove that
the directors acted recklessly.
142
133. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278, 290 (Del. Ch. 2003).
134. See id. at 289.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 289-90.
137. No. CIV.A-9700, 2001 WL 115340 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2001).
138. See id. at *26 n.66.
139. Id. at **17, 18.
140. See id. at *26 n.66.
141. See id. at *26.
142. Id. at *26 n.66.
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2. Federal Appellate Courts Have Held that Section 102(b)(7) Does
Not Protect Directors from Liability Arising from Reckless
Conduct
Given Delaware's significant influence on corporate law throughout
the United States, 143 other jurisdictions have considered recklessness and
good faith when interpreting section 102(b)(7) or its local equivalent.
1 44
For example, in McCall v. Scott,145 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that section 102(b)(7) 146 did not protect the
McCall directors from personal liability arising from reckless conduct.
147
The McCall directors allegedly knew that the senior managers' policies
encouraged employees to engage in illegal activities, but the directors
recklessly failed to address these policies.148 The court found that the
directors' "sustained inattention to their management obligations" and
"intentional ignorance of' and "willful blindness" to "red flags"
surpassed mere breaches of the duty of due care. 149 The Sixth Circuit
concluded that "[u]nder Delaware law, the duty of good faith may be
breached where a director consciously disregards his duties to the
corporation, thereby causing its stockholders to suffer."
'1 50
The Sixth Circuit's reference to Delaware law on the conscious
disregard of directorial duties 151 came entirely from a footnote in Nagy v.
Bistricer. 52 In Nagy, the Delaware chancery court discussed whether
directors breached their fiduciary duties by merging the corporation with
143. See generally William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in
the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 Bus. LAW. 351 (1992) (stating that the
Delaware Court of Chancery plays an important part in the United States legal system and that most
United States corporations have formed in Delaware because the court has the highest standards of
responsibility and excellency).
144. See, e.g., McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 1000-01 (6th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter McCall I]
(adjudicating corporate liability under section 102(b)(7) for a corporation that had amended its
certificate of incorporation to include section 102(b)(7)), amended by 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001)
[hereinafter McCall I1].
145. 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001), amended by 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001).
146. The defendant was incorporated in Delaware and had amended its certificate of
incorporation to include section 102(b)(7), which required that the Sixth Circuit apply Delaware
law. See id. at 1000.
147. McCall II, 250 F.3d at 1000-01.
148. McCallI, 239 F.3d at 814-15.
149. McCall II, 250 F.3d at 1001 (internal quotations omitted).
150. Id. (citation omitted).
151. See id.
152. 770 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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a second corporation controlled by the directors. 153 While listing the
plaintiffs allegations in the factual background section, 154 the chancellor
discussed the relationship between the duty of loyalty and the duty of
good faith in a footnote.155 In the footnote, the chancellor concluded that
the duty of good faith is subsumed within the duty of loyalty,156 and, at
best, it is a reminder that "regardless of his motive, a director who
consciously disregards his duties to the corporation and its stockholders
may suffer a personal judgment for monetary damages for any harm he
causes."1 57 The chancellor provided no authority for this statement.
Two years after the McCall decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in In re Abbott Laboratories,158
followed McCall by concluding that evidence of directors' reckless
conduct is sufficient to prove bad faith. 159 The plaintiffs in Abbott
accused the directors of acting grossly negligent, recklessly, and
intentionally when the directors failed to address employee misconduct
that led to repeated violations of FDA regulations. 160 The Seventh
Circuit quoted nearly every line from the McCall decision that discussed
Delaware's recklessness standard and concluded that the corporation's
section 102(b)(7)-like provision 16' did not protect the directors from
liability arising from their recklessness. 62 In fact, the Seventh Circuit
relied so heavily on the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Delaware law
that it cited to the McCall decision even when it relied on the Nagy quote
that recklessness is sufficient to prove bad faith under Delaware law. 163
In sum, the extent of section 102(b)(7) protections is still unclear. 164
Courts agree that section 102(b)(7) protects directors from liability for
all breaches of the duty of due care 165 and that it offers no protection
153. Id. at 46.
154. Id. at 49.
155. Id. at 49 n.2.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003).
159. Seeid. at811.
160. Id.
161. The Seventh Circuit was interpreting an Illinois statute, 805 ILL. COMP STAT. 5/8.65, that
was modeled after Delaware's section 102(b)(7). Id. at 810.
162. Id. at 811.
163. Id. (citing McCall II, 250 F.3d 997, 1001 (6th Cir. 2001), but applying the Nagy quote).
164. See Veasey et al., supra note 1, at 403.
165. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093, 1095 (Del. 2000); Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d
1050, 1061 (Del. 1996).
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from liability for breaches of the duty of good faith. 166 However, courts
are divided over whether section 102(b)(7) protects directors from
liability arising from recklessness. 
167
III. SECTION 102(b)(7) PROTECTS DIRECTORS FROM
PERSONAL LIABILITY ARISING FROM RECKLESSNESS
Under Delaware State Supreme Court precedent, section 102(b)(7)
should protect directors from personal liability arising from recklessness
for two reasons. First, Delaware corporate law includes recklessness
within its gross negligence standard. 168 Given that Delaware courts agree
that section 102(b)(7) protects directors from liability arising from gross
negligence, 169 the statute should accordingly protect directors from
liability arising from recklessness, which is a subset of gross
negligence. 7 ° Second, even if recklessness is not a subset of gross
negligence, recklessness does not breach the duty of good faith because
reckless actors lack a bad faith motive.171 Without this requisite motive,
recklessness is not a breach of the duty of good faith,172 but is instead a
breach of the duty of due care. 17 3 As a breach of the duty of due care,
section 102(b)(7) protects directors from liability arising from
recklessness. 
74
166. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(stating that section 102(b)(7) does not protect directors from personal liability arising from conduct
not undertaken in good faith).
167. Compare Zirn, 681 A.2d at 1061-62 (Del. 1996), and Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
871, 873 (Del. 1985), with Disney, 825 A.2d at 286.
168. See Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., No. CIV.A-7861, 1990 WL 42607, at *12 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 5, 1990).
169. See, e.g., Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1089-90 (stating that section 102(b)(7) protects directors
from liability even if the complaint is construed to allege gross negligence).
170. See, e.g., Tomczak, 1990 WL 42607, at *12 (stating that gross negligence includes
recklessness).
171. See, e.g., Cortt'l Ins. Co. v. Dooley, No. CIV.A.02C-07-065JOH, 2003 WL 1903771, at *6
(Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2003) (applying the definition of recklessness from DEL. P.J.I. CIV. § 5.9,
which defines "recklessness" as the "knowing disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk").
172. Also, it does not implicate the duty of loyalty. See supra Part I.B.
173. If it does not fall under the duties of loyalty or good faith, the only remaining option is the
duty of due care. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)
(discussing the three components of fiduciary duty: duty of loyalty, duty of care, and duty of good
faith).
174. See, e.g., Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1092-93 (noting that section 102(b)(7) protects directors
from liability arising from all breaches of the duty of due care).
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A. Section 102(b)(7) Protects Directors from Liability Arising from
Reckless Conduct Because Corporate Recklessness Is a Subset of
Gross Negligence
Section 102(b)(7) protects directors from liability arising from
recklessness because corporate recklessness is a subset of gross
negligence. 175 As stated by the Tomczak court and acknowledged by
Delaware chancellors and treatises, corporate gross negligence includes
reckless indifference. 176 Therefore, corporate recklessness is a part of the
larger classification of grossly negligent conduct. Because section
102(b)(7) protects directors from liability arising from gross
negligence,1 77 it should also protect them from liability arising from a
subset of gross negligence-recklessness.
In Van Gorkom, the Delaware State Supreme Court suggested that
recklessness is a subset of gross negligence. 178 The Van Gorkom court
imposed liability on. directors for conduct that the court classified as
reckless. 179 Although the court described the directors' conduct as
reckless, it ultimately concluded that this reckless conduct did not
constitute bad faith. 80 Instead, the court held that the directors'
misconduct amounted to gross negligence, which breached the directors'
duty of due care.1 8'
Accordingly, because recklessness is a subset of gross negligence,
182
section 102(b)(7) protects directors from personal liability arising from
175. See, e.g., Tomczak, 1990 WL 42607, at *12 (noting that in the corporate context, gross
negligence means recklessness) (quoting Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch.
1929)); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 970 (Del. Ch. 1986) (same); see also
WARD ET AL., supra note 68, § 141.2 (same); Allen et al., supra note 5, at 453 (same).
176. See Tomczak, 1990 WL 42607, at *12 (quoting Allaun, 147 A. at 261); Rabkin, 547 A.2d at
970; WARD ET AL., supra note 68, § 141.2; Allen et al., supra note 5, at 453.
177. See Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1092-93 (noting that section 102(b)(7) protects directors from
personal liability arising from gross negligence).
178. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 871 (Del. 1985) (stating that the lower court erred
in finding that grossly negligent directors had not acted "recklessly or improvidently").
179. See id.
180. See id. at 873.
181. See id.
182. See, e.g., Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., No. CIV.A-7861, 1990 WL 42607, at *12 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 5, 1990) (noting that in the corporate context, gross negligence means recklessness);
Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 970 (Del. Ch. 1986) (noting that gross
negligence means recklessness in Delaware corporate law); see also WARD ET AL., supra note 68,
§ 141.2.2.4 (same); Allen et al., supra note 5, at 453 (same).
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recklessness. 183 The Delaware State Supreme Court has consistently held
that section 102(b)(7) protects directors from liability arising from their
own gross negligence.1 84 Grossly negligent conduct does not breach the
duty of good faith; rather, it breaches the duty of due care. 85 Therefore,
once directors establish that the plaintiff's recklessness claim amounts
only to a breach of the duty of due care, the directors may invoke section
102(b)(7) to have the court summarily dismiss the claim.1 86
B. Even if Recklessness Is Not a Subset of Gross Negligence, Section
102(b)(7) Protects Directors from Liability Arising from
Recklessness Because Reckless Directors Lack a Bad Faith Motive
Even if recklessness is not a subset of gross negligence, section
102(b)(7) protects directors from liability arising from recklessness. The
Delaware State Supreme Court requires proof of an illicit motive or bad
faith state of mind to establish that conduct was carried out in bad
faith. 187 Because recklessness describes only conduct that lacks intent to
cause harm,1 88 reckless directors lack the illicit motive or bad faith state
of mind intrinsic to bad faith conduct. 189 Without this requisite state of
mind, reckless directors do not breach the duty of good faith, but instead
breach only the duty of due care.' 90 Because recklessness is a breach of
the duty of due care, section 102(b)(7) protects directors from personal
liability arising from their recklessness. 191
183. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1092-93 (Del. 2000) (noting that section
102(b)(7) protects directors from personal liability arising from gross negligence).
184. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) (stating that Delaware
courts have consistently held that section 102(b)(7) protects directors from liability arising from all
duty of due care violations); Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1092-93 (noting that section 102(b)(7) protects
directors from personal liability arising from gross negligence).
185. See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873-74 (concluding that the directors acted with gross
negligence but in good faith).
186. See Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1092-93.
187. See Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, I, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199,
1208 (Del. 1993).
188. See supra Part I.C.3.
189. See Desert Equities, 624 A.2d at 1208.
190. See id.
191. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) (stating that section 102(b)(7)
protects directors from liability arising from all duty of due care violations).
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1. A Breach of the Duty of Good Faith Requires a Bad Faith Motive
The Delaware State Supreme Court requires that defendants have a
bad faith motive or illicit intent to breach the duty of good faith. 192 For
example, the Desert Equities court, focusing on the defendants'
subjective intent, stated that the plaintiffs allegations of bad faith relied
upon the defendants' "tortious state of mind."' 93 The court further
explained that bad faith "implies the conscious doing of a wrong because
of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; ... it contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.'' 194 This
discussion of bad faith demonstrates that defendants must have a bad
faith motive or illicit state of mind to establish that the defendants
engaged in bad faith conduct. 195
As in Desert Equities, the Delaware State Supreme Court in Zirn
evaluated the directors' motives to determine whether they acted in bad
faith. 196 The court held that the directors had not breached their duty of
good faith because the directors had no "pecuniary motive" or any "other
plausible motive for deceiving the stockholders."' 197 Therefore, the court
acknowledged that directors must have an illicit motive for their conduct
to amount to a breach of the duty of good faith.
198
Additionally, Van Gorkom demonstrates that the Delaware State
Supreme Court will not find a breach of the duty of good faith without
proof that directors acted with a bad faith motive. 199 The Van Gorkom
court stated that it need not evaluate the directors' motives because there
was no proof or allegation that the directors acted in bad faith.200 The
192. See, e.g., Desert Equities, 624 A.2d at 1208 (stating that a claim of bad faith relies upon a
person's state of mind).
193. Id.
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. The Delaware Chancery Court recently quoted Desert Equities while considering whether
directors breached the duty of good faith in the section 102(b)(7) context. McGowan v. Ferro, No.
CIV.A-18672, 2004 WL 2340041, at *15-16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 2004). Other lower courts in
Delaware have also applied Desert Equities's discussion of bad faith to other situations. For
example, a Delaware superior court applied the Desert Equities bad faith definition to the insurance
realm. Stuart v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Del., Inc., No. CIV.A.92C-03-018, 1994 WL 89795, at
*3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 1994).
196. See Zim v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1061-62 (Del. 1996).
197. Id. (emphasis added).
198. See id.
199. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
200. See id.
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court suggested that, had the plaintiff alleged bad faith conduct, the court
would be required to evaluate the directors' motives. 20 ' Therefore, to
202breach the duty of good faith, directors must have a bad faith motive.
2. Recklessness Lacks a Bad Faith Motive and Therefore Falls Within
the Protections of Section 102(b)(7) as a Breach of the Duty of Due
Care
Recklessness, by definition, is conduct without a bad faith motive.20 3
Reckless directors might be conscious of and indifferent to the fact that
their conduct could cause harm, but they do not intend to cause the
harm.20 4 A director with a bad faith motive, on the other hand, intends to
cause harm.20 5 Instead of acting with indifference as to whether a
negative result materializes, directors who act in bad faith intend to bring
about the resulting harm.206 Therefore, reckless directors do not have a
bad faith motive.
Without the requisite bad faith motive, recklessness falls within the
protections of section 102(b)(7) as a breach of the duty of due care.
Reckless directors do not breach the duty of good faith because they
have no bad faith motive.20 7 Unless directors have a conflict of interest
with the corporation or its shareholders, the directors do not breach the
duty of loyalty.20 8 Therefore, the only fiduciary duty that a reckless
director breaches is the duty of due care. 20 9 Because recklessness is a
breach of the duty of due care, section 102(b)(7) protects directors from
personal liability arising from recklessness.
210
201. See id.
202. See id.; see also Zirn, 681 A.2d at 1061-62 (stating that the directors acted in good faith
because they lacked any motive to deceive or harm the corporation or its shareholders).
203. See, e.g., Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Dooley, No. CIV.A.02C-07-065JOH, 2003 WL 1903771, at *6
(Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2003) (applying the definition of recklessness from DEL. P.J.I. CiV. § 5.9,
which defines "recklessness" as the "knowing disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk").
204. See id.
205. See Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199,
1208 (Del. 1993); see also McGowan v. Ferro, No. CIV.A-18672, 2004 WL 2340041, at *15-16
(Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 2004) (concluding that bad faith depends upon a defendant's ill will state of mind)
(quoting Desert Equities, 624 A.2d at 1208 n.16).
206. See Desert Equities, 624 A.2d at 1208.
207. See id.
208. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
209. See id. (discussing the triad of fiduciary duties).
210. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093-94 (Del. 2000) (noting that section
102(b)(7) protects directors from personal liability arising from all breaches of the duty of due care).
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3. The Disney, McCall, and Abbott Courts Erroneously Held that
Directorial Recklessness Breaches the Duty of Good Faith
The Disney chancellor ignored binding Delaware State Supreme
Court precedent by holding that reckless conduct breaches a director's
duty of good faith.2" The Disney chancellor's description of how the
Disney directors abrogated their oversight responsibility is substantially
similar to the Delaware State Supreme Court's description of the Van
Gorkom directors' conduct. 212 Directors from both cases relied almost
entirely on the CEO's recommendation; 213 they made their decisions
with little or no deliberation or factual information;214 and they failed to
satisfy their oversight roles by questioning or even evaluating a material
corporate decision.21 5 Despite the substantially similar directorial
conduct, the Delaware State Supreme Court stated that there was no
proof or allegations of a breach of the duty of good faith in Van
Gorkom, 16 whereas the Disney chancellor opined that the Disney
directors' conduct amounted to a breach of the duty of good faith.21 7
Although the Van Gorkom decision set binding precedent, the Disney
chancellor failed to distinguish the two cases or even mention Van
Gorkom.218
In addition to omitting any reference to Van Gorkom, the Disney
chancellor also failed to discuss the Delaware State Supreme Court's
other binding precedent established in Desert Equities and Zirn.219 The
Desert Equities court stated that a plaintiff cannot establish bad faith
conduct without proving that the defendant had a dishonest purpose or ill
will state of mind.220 The Disney chancellor did not evaluate the
211. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) (failing
to discuss Van Gorkom).
212. Compare Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 869, 874 (Del. 1985), with Disney, 825 A.2d at 281-
82,287.
213. Compare Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 869, 893, with Disney, 825 A.2d at 281, 287.
214. Compare Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874, with Disney, 825 A.2d at 281, 287.
215. Compare Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 869-70, with Disney, 825 A.2d at 281-82.
216. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (finding no proof of bad faith conduct).
217. Disney, 825 A.2d at 286 ("A fair reading of the new complaint, in my opinion, gives rise to a
reason to doubt whether the board's actions were taken honestly and in good faith .....
218. See generally id. (failing to mention Van Gorkom).
219. See generally id. (failing to mention Desert Equities and Zirn).
220. See Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199,
1208 (Del. 1993).
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directors' state of mind or distinguish Disney from Desert Equities."'
Moreover, the Zirn court stated that directors who act in bad faith have a
pecuniary motive or some other motive for deceiving the
shareholders.222 Again, the Disney chancellor failed to evaluate the
Disney directors' motives and failed to distinguish Zirn.22
3
Like the Disney chancellor, the Sixth Circuit in McCall and the
Seventh Circuit in Abbott erroneously found reckless conduct sufficient
to prove a breach of the duty of good faith.224 The McCall court cited the
Nagy decision to support its basic premise that "[u]nder Delaware law,
the duty of good faith may be breached where a director consciously
disregards his duties to the corporation, thereby causing its stockholders
to suffer., 2
25
However, the Sixth Circuit's reliance on this Nagy quote suffers from
four flaws. First, the quote is from a footnote in the factual background
section of a chancery court opinion. 26 If Delaware courts had accepted
this legal concept, the concept would appear as a holding or at least as a
finding in the legal discussion section of other courts' opinions. Second,
the Nagy chancellor cited no authority to support his conclusion.227
Third, no Delaware court has cited Nagy for the proposition that
directors' conscious disregard of their corporate duties breached the duty
of good faith even though Delaware courts have faced this issue many
times since Nagy.228 Fourth, the Nagy chancellor made this comment
while explaining that the duty of good faith has no legal significance
independent of the duty of loyalty. 229 Because the Abbott court relied
exclusively on McCall to conclude that recklessness breaches the duty of
221. See generally Disney, 825 A.2d 275 (failing to mention Desert Equities or evaluate the
directors' state of mind).
222. See Zirn v. VL Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1061-62 (Del. 1996).
223. See generally Disney, 825 A.2d 275 (failing to mention Zirn or evaluate the directors'
motives).
224. See In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 811 (7th Cir. 2003);
McCall II, 250 F.3d 997, 1001 (6th Cir. 2001).
225. McCall 11, 250 F.3d at 1001.
226. See Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48-49 (Del. Ch. 2000).
227. See id.
228. For example, Disney involved the same issue as addressed in the Nagy footnote, namely
whether recklessness is sufficient to breach the duty of good faith, but the Disney chancellor did not
cite to Nagy. See generally Disney, 825 A.2d 275.
229. Nagy, 770 A.2d at 49 n.2 (concluding that the duty of good faith is not independent from the
duty of loyalty); see also supra Part IL.C (discussing lack of consensus about whether section
102(b)(7) protects directors from personal liability arising from reckless conduct).
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good faith under Delaware jurisprudence,230 the Abbott decision suffers
from the same flaws as the McCall decision. Accordingly, the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits erroneously interpreted Delaware law to hold that
reckless conduct is sufficient to prove a breach of the duty of good faith.
Therefore, those courts that held that recklessness breaches the duty
of good faith erred. The courts ignored binding Delaware precedent and
misinterpreted Delaware law. Instead, they should have concluded that
reckless conduct does not breach the duty of good faith because reckless
directors do not intend to cause harm.
In sum, section 102(b)(7) protects directors from personal liability
arising from recklessness because recklessness is a breach of the duty of
due care instead of a breach of the duty of good faith. The Delaware
State Supreme Court has clearly required a bad faith state of mind to
establish that directors acted in bad faith.2 31 Because reckless directors,
by definition, lack a bad faith state of mind,232 they do not act in bad
faith. Therefore, recklessness does not breach the duty of good faith, but
instead breaches only the duty of due care. As such, section 102(b)(7)
protects directors from personal liability arising from recklessness. 33
IV. CONCLUSION
Currently, confusion exists over whether section 102(b)(7) protects
directors from personal liability arising from their own reckless conduct.
When addressing this issue, the Delaware State Supreme Court should
resolve the confusion by concluding that section 102(b)(7) protects
directors from personal liability arising from recklessness for two
reasons. First, recklessness is merely a subset of gross negligence in
Delaware corporate jurisprudence. Because section 102(b)(7)
unambiguously protects directors from personal liability arising from
gross negligence, it concomitantly protects directors from liability
arising from recklessness, which is a subset of gross negligence. Second,
230. See In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 811 (7th Cir. 2003)
(relying solely on McCall IIto reach the holding that recklessness breaches the duty of good faith).
231. See, e.g., Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1061-62 (Del. 1996) (stating that the directors
acted in good faith because they lacked any motive to deceive or harm the corporation or its
shareholders); Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d
1199, 1208 (Del. 1993) (stating that a claim of bad faith relies upon a person's state of mind).
232. See DEL. P.J.I. CIV. § 5.9; see also Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Dooley, No. CIV.A.02C-07-065JOH,
2003 WL 1903771, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2003) (applying the recklessness definition from
DEL. P.J.I. CIV. § 5.9).
233. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093-94 (Del. 2000).
1150
Vol. 79:1125, 2004
Personal Liability of Reckless Directors
the Delaware State Supreme Court requires proof of an illicit motive or
bad faith state of mind before concluding that conduct was carried out in
bad faith. Because recklessness describes only conduct with no intent to
cause harm, reckless directors lack the illicit motive or bad faith state of
mind intrinsic to bad faith conduct. Therefore, the Delaware State
Supreme Court should remain consistent with Delaware precedent by
holding that section 102(b)(7) protects directors from personal liability
arising from their own recklessness.
Protecting directors from personal liability arising from their
recklessness may seem counterintuitive. However, it is important to
remember that section 102(b)(7) protects directors only if shareholders
first vote to amend the corporation's certificate of incorporation to
include that protection. Further, the Delaware General Assembly
specifically acted to provide this protection to directors where
shareholders consent. If the General Assembly believes that the statute
produces inequities, it can amend or repeal the statute at any time.
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